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Abstract: In the multisensor sequential change detection problem, a dis-
ruption occurs in an environment monitored by multiple sensors. This dis-
ruption induces a change in the observations of an unknown subset of sen-
sors. In the Byzantine version of this problem, which is the focus of this
work, it is further assumed that the postulated change-point model may be
misspecified for an unknown subset of sensors. The problem then is to detect
the change quickly and reliably, for any possible subset of affected sensors,
even if the misspecified sensors are controlled by an adversary. Given a user-
specified upper bound on the number of compromised sensors, we propose
and study three families of sequential change-detection rules for this prob-
lem. These are designed and evaluated under a generalization of Lorden’s
criterion, where conditional expected detection delay and expected time to
false alarm are both computed in the worst-case scenario for the compro-
mised sensors. The first-order asymptotic performance of these procedures
is characterized as the worst-case false alarm rate goes to 0. The insights
from these theoretical results are corroborated by a simulation study.
AMS 2000 subject classifications: Primary 62L10, 60G40.
Keywords and phrases: Byzantine, CUSUM, Multichannel, Quickest
change detection, Sequential change detection.
1. Introduction
Suppose that a system is monitored in real time by multiple sensors that com-
municate with a fusion center. At an unknown time, a disruption occurs and
induces a change in the observations of a subset of deployed sensors. In this con-
text, the multisensor (or multichannel) sequential (or quickest) change detection
problem is to combine at the fusion center the information from all sensors in
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order to detect the change as soon as possible, while controlling the rate of false
alarms. This problem has been studied extensively when the change is perceived
by exactly one unknown sensor [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. The assumption of a unique
affected sensor has been removed in various recent works, where the change is
allowed to affect an arbitrary, unknown subset of sensors [7, 8, 9]. In this con-
text, even in the absence of any information regarding the affected sensors, it
is possible to achieve the optimal detection performance, in Lorden’s sense [10],
up to a first-order asymptotic approximation [7], or even up to a constant term
[9], as the false alarm rate goes to 0. In a related line of research, the affected
sensors perceive the change at possibly different times [11, 12, 13, 14, 15], and
the goal is to detect the first of these times.
In all these references it is assumed that the observations in the unaffected
sensors continue to behave in the same way as before the disruption takes place.
A different formulation, inspired by the Byzantine generals problem in fault
tolerant design [16], was considered in [17]. There, it was assumed that the
change is perceived by all sensors apart from a single, unknown sensor that is
compromised, in the sense that its observations are generated by an adversary.
This formulation is motivated by the interest in designing fault tolerant quickest
detection schemes in security related scenarios, where an adversary might take
control of certain deployed sensors in order to foil change-detection schemes. We
can also think of this formulation as a robust version of the classical multichan-
nel sequential change-detection problem, where the postulated model in some
sensors is not correctly specified.
The solution that was proposed in [17] for this problem was a decentralized
second alarm, where each sensor computes its local Cumulative Sums (CUSUM)
statistic [18], raises an alarm as soon as this statistic exceeds a fixed threshold,
and the fusion center stops as soon as two distinct sensors have raised an alarm.
This scheme was analyzed under a generalized version of Lorden’s criterion,
where the worst case scenario is considered for the change-point, the observa-
tions in up to the change-point, and also the strategy of the adversary. In this
context it was shown that the worst-case detection delay of the second alarm
grows logarithmically with its worst-case expected time to false alarm, a prop-
erty that is not preserved by the centralized CUSUM rule that assumes that
all sensors are honest and affected. Moreover, it was shown that the perfor-
mance of the second alarm can be significantly improved if it is applied, in a
centralized fashion, to three disjoint groups of sensors. However, the asymptotic
performance of these two schemes was not characterized, and neither of them
was shown to be efficient or optimal in any sense.
In this work we generalize the Byzantine sequential change detection pro-
posed in [17] in two ways. First, we allow for more than one sensors to be
compromised, and second, we allow for only an unknown subset of honest sen-
sors to be affected by the change. Thus, we have three categories of sensors:
the corrupt (or compromised) ones, which are assumed to be controlled by an
adversary, the honest ones that perceive the change, and the honest ones that
do not perceive the change.
In this context, we propose and study three families of multichannel sequen-
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tial change-detection schemes that require the computation of the local CUSUM
statistics at the sensors and are parametrized by a number L that takes values
between 1 and K, the total number of sensors. In the first one, the fusion cen-
ter raises an alarm when L individual local CUSUM statistics have crossed a
common threshold, and we refer to it as the Lth alarm; the second alarm pro-
posed in [17] is a special case of this family (L = 2). In the second, the fusion
center stops when L sensors agree that the change has occurred, in the sense
that their corresponding local CUSUM statistics are simultaneously above a
common threshold; we refer to it as voting rule, since it requires from each sen-
sor to “vote” at each time whether the change has occurred. In the third one,
the fusion center stops when the sum of the L smallest local CUSUM statistics
exceeds a threshold, and we refer to it as Low-Sum-CUSUM.
We assume that there is a known, user-specified upper bound,M , on the num-
ber of compromised sensors, and we design and analyze the proposed schemes
under a generalization of Lorden’s criterion, where the conditional expected de-
tection delay and expected time to false alarm are evaluated in the worst case
regarding the strategy of the adversary when there are exactly M corrupt sensors.
The main contributions of this work are the following: first of all, for each
family of detection rules under consideration, we obtain bounds on L so that the
resulting rules can control the worst-case false alarm rate below an arbitrary,
user-specified level, and achieve non-trivial detection performance whenever the
size of the affected subset is larger than M . A particular case of interest arises
when K−M = M + 1. In this case, the only possible value for L is M + 1 in all
schemes, and the three resulting procedures are shown to be strictly ordered.
Specifically, for any given false alarm rate, the (M + 1)-alarm is shown to be
strictly better than the corresponding voting rule, and the latter strictly better
than Low-Sum-CUSUM.
In order to select the parameter L and compare the proposed procedures
when K −M > M + 1, we conduct an asymptotic analysis and characterize
their performance up to a first-order asymptotic approximation as the worst-
case false alarm rate goes to 0. These asymptotic results suggest that the most
appropriate choice for L is M + 1 for the Lth alarm and K −M for Low-Sum-
CUSUM. With this selection of L, the first-order asymptotic detection delay of
Low-Sum-CUSUM is |B| −M times smaller than that of the (M + 1)-alarm,
where B is the affected subset and |B| its size.
On the other hand, the proposed choice for L, and the resulting asymptotic
performance, in the family of voting rules depends on the prior knowledge re-
garding the size of the affected subset, |B|. In the absence of any information, we
suggest setting L = M + 1, in which case the resulting voting rule has the same
first-order asymptotic performance as the (M + 1)-alarm. When |B| is known in
advance, we suggest setting L = |B|, in which case the resulting voting rule has
the same first-order asymptotic performance as Low-Sum-CUSUM.
Finally, similarly to [17], when K > 2M + 1 we also consider a centralized
version of the (M + 1)-alarm and quantify its asymptotic performance when it
is known in advance that all honest sensors are affected. In this setup, we show
that the first-order asymptotic performance of the centralized (M + 1)-alarm is
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K/(2M+1) smaller than that of the decentralized (M+1)-alarm. The resulting
performance however is inferior to that of the voting rule and Low-Sum-CUSUM
with L = K −M .
These theoretical results are supported by two simulation studies, where all
honest sensors are affected and there is only one compromised sensor (M = 1).
In the first one, the number of honest sensors exceeds by 1 the number of corrupt
sensors, and as predicted from our theoretical results, the (M+1)-alarm is shown
to perform better than the voting rule, and the latter to perform better than
Low-Sum-CUSUM. In the second simulation study, the number of honest sensors
is larger than M + 1, in which case the previous order is completely reversed.
Moreover, the centralized (M + 1)-alarm performs significantly better than the
decentralized (M + 1)-alarm, but, as expected, worse than the voting rule and
Low-Sum-CUSUM with L = K −M .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we formulate the
problem mathematically. In Section 3 we study various CUSUM-based, sequen-
tial change-detection procedures in the classical multichannel formulation where
there are no corrupt sensors, or equivalently the honest sensors are known in
advance. In Section 4 we introduce and study the proposed procedures in the
presence of corrupt sensors. In Section 5, we present the results of two simulation
studies. We conclude in Section 6.
In terms of notation, we denote by Θ(1) a non-zero constant term, by O(1) a
bounded from above term, and by o(1) a vanishing term in a limiting sense that
will be understood by the context. We set x ∼ y when x/y → 1, x ≤ y(1 + o(1))
when lim sup(x/y) ≤ 1, x ≥ y(1 + o(1)) when lim inf(x/y) ≥ 1. Moreover, we
set x+ = max{x, 0} and we use | · | to denote the size of a set.
2. Problem formulation
Suppose data are collected sequentially from K sensors. For each k ∈ [K], let
Xk ≡ {Xkt }t∈N be the sequence of observations in the kth sensor, where N =
{1, 2, . . .} and [K] = {1, . . . ,K}. We assume that there is a subset N ⊆ [K] of
independent sensors, in the sense that {Xk, k ∈ N} are independent sequences.
For each k ∈ N , Xk is a sequence of independent random variables, which
are initially distributed according to some density f . This density changes in
a subset of sensors, B ⊆ N , at some unknown, deterministic point in time
ν ∈ {0, 1, . . .} (change-point). That is,
Xkt ∼ f, t ∈ N, k ∈ N \ B,
Xkt ∼
{
f, t ≤ ν
g, t > ν,
k ∈ B. (2.1)
We assume that f and g are known densities with respect to a σ-finite measure
λ and denote by I their Kullback-Leibler information number:
0 < I ≡
∫
log
(
g(x)
f(x)
)
g(x)λ(dx) <∞. (2.2)
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This is a homogeneous change-point model, in the sense that the pre-change
densities are the same in all sensors, and so are the post-change densities in
those sensors that perceive the change. We assume that I > 0 without loss of
generality, since otherwise f = g λ-almost everywhere, and also I <∞, which is
a standard assumption in the asymptotic analysis of sequential change-detection
procedures (see e.g., [10]). We will refer to certain results in the literature that
require the following second-moment assumption:∫ (
log
(
g(x)
f(x)
))2
g(x)λ(dx) <∞. (2.3)
However, our standing assumption throughout the paper is that (2.2) holds, and
will not be stated explicitly from now on.
Since the change-point is unknown and observations are collected sequen-
tially, the problem is to find a stopping rule that determines when to stop and
declare that the change has occurred based on the data from all sensors. More
formally, a sequential change-detection rule is an {Ft}-stopping time, where Ft
is the σ-field generated by the observations in all sensors up to time t, i.e.,
Ft = σ
(
Xks : 1 ≤ s ≤ t, k ∈ [K]
)
.
Our goal is to propose detection rules that are able to detect the change quickly
and reliably even in the worst-case scenario that the sensors that do not belong
to N are controlled by an adversary who tries to prevent the detection of the
change. Thus, we refer to the sensors in N as honest, and to those that do not
belong to N as corrupt, or compromised. Moreover, we refer to the sensors in
B ⊆ N as affected (by the change), and to the ones in N \ B as unaffected (by
the change).
We assume that there are at most M corrupt sensors, where M ≥ 0 is a
user-specified number that can be determined based on prior information on
the quality of each sensor. Alternatively, we can think of M as a parameter that
represents the amount of robustness that we want to introduce to the classical
multichannel problem, which corresponds to the case M = 0. When M = 1 we
recover the setup considered in [17]. We consider the worst possible scenario
regarding the number of corrupt sensors and the strategy of the adversary.
Indeed, our analysis focuses on the case that there are exactly M corrupt
sensors, and consequently |N | = K−M honest sensors, with the understanding
that the proposed procedures will still be effective when the true number of
corrupt sensors is smaller than M . Since we consider a homogeneous change-
point model, we can assume without loss of generality that the subset of honest
sensors, N , is an arbitrary subset of size K −M . This allows us to lighten the
notation by suppressing in what follows the dependence onN of many quantities
of interest.
In order to identify the worst-case regarding the strategy of the adversary, we
assume that the latter knows the true change-point and affected subset, and has
the same access to the observations of the honest sensors as the fusion center.
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To be more specific, let Ht denote the σ-field generated by the observations in
the honest sensors up to time t, i.e.
Ht = σ
(
Xks : 1 ≤ s ≤ t, k ∈ N
)
,
suppressing its dependence on N . Then, we assume that the observations in the
corrupt sensors at time t form a Ht-measurable random vector, i.e., there is a
Borel function pit so that
XN
c
t = pit
(
XNs , 1 ≤ s ≤ t
)
,
where for each subset C ⊆ [K] and time t we use the following notation:
XCt ≡ (Xkt , k ∈ C). We define the strategy of the adversary as the family of
deterministic functions
pi ≡ {pit : t ∈ N},
suppressing its dependence on N , ν and B. We will consider the worst-case
scenario regarding the strategy of the adversary when we evaluate both the
detection delay and the false alarm rate of a procedure.
We denote the probability measure in the underlying canonical space by PB,piν
when the change occurs at time ν in a subset B ⊆ N of honest sensors and the
strategy of the adversary is pi, with the understanding that under Ppi∞ there is no
change in the honest sensors. We simply write PBν and P∞ instead of P
B,pi
ν and
Ppi∞ when the event of interest depends only on observations from the honest
sensors. Following Lorden’s [10] approach, we quantify the delay of a sequential
change-detection rule T when the change occurs in subset B with the following
criterion:
JB[T ] = sup
ν,pi
essup EB,piν
[
(T − ν)+ |Fν
]
,
where EB,piν is expectation under P
B,pi
ν . Thus, we consider the worst-case sce-
nario with respect to change-point ν and the observations until the time of the
change, as in Lorden’s criterion, but now we also consider the worst-case sce-
nario regarding the strategy of the adversary in the subset of M corrupt sensors
that it controls. We also take a worst-case approach in the quantification of the
expected time to false alarm, which we define as follows:
A[T ] = inf
pi
Epi∞[T ].
We denote by Cγ the class of sequential change-detection rules for which the
worst-case expected time to false alarm is bounded below by some user-specified
constant γ > 1, i.e., Cγ = {T : A[T ] ≥ γ}. We are interested in designing se-
quential change-detection rules that belong to Cγ for some arbitrary γ > 1, and
at the same time have “small” worst-case detection delay, JB, for ideally every
possible affected subset, B. This will turn out to be possible for the proposed
procedures only when the size of the affected subset, |B|, is larger than M . With
this in mind, we introduce the following notion of domination in order to com-
pare detection rules in our context.
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Definition 1. Let T and S be two multichannel sequentially change-detection
rules. We say that S dominates T if JB[T ] ≥ JB[S] for every B ⊆ N so that
M + 1 ≤ |B| ≤ K −M whenever A[T ] ≤ A[S].
Such a strict domination property will arise only in the special case that
K = 2M + 1. In general, our comparisons will rely on asymptotic approxima-
tions as the worst-case false alarm rate goes to 0, which leads to the following
definition.
Definition 2. Let T and S be multichannel sequential change-detection rules.
We say that S is asymptotically more efficient than T if JB[T ] ≥ JB[S] (1+o(1))
for every B ⊆ N so that M + 1 ≤ |B| ≤ K −M as A[T ] = A[S]→∞.
3. The classical multichannel setup
In this section we consider the classical multichannel framework where there are
no corrupt sensors, or equivalently the subset, N , of honest sensors is known
in advance, but the subset of affected sensors, B ⊆ N , is not. The procedures
and results of this section will provide the basis for the methods and analysis
in Section 4 where N will also be unknown. However, the results in this section
may also be of independent interest for the classical multichannel problem itself,
as we revisit various multichannel, CUSUM-based schemes in the literature.
3.1. Notation
For each C ⊆ N and t ∈ N we denote by ZCt the cumulative log-likelihood ratio
of the first t observations in the sensors in C, i.e.,
ZCt = Z
C
t−1 +
∑
k∈C
`kt ; Z
C
0 ≡ 0, (3.1)
where `kt is the log-likelihood ratio of the t
th observation in sensor k, i.e.,
`kt = log
(
g(Xkt )
f(Xkt )
)
. (3.2)
We denote by W Ct Page’s [18] CUSUM statistic at time t for detecting a change
in subset C ⊆ N , i.e.,
W Ct =
(
W Ct−1 +
∑
k∈C
`kt
)+
; W C0 ≡ 0.
We denote by σC(h) the corresponding CUSUM stopping time, that is the first
time the process W C exceeds a positive threshold h, i.e.,
σC(h) = inf
{
t ∈ N : W Ct ≥ h
}
. (3.3)
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When C = {k} for some k ∈ C, we simply write Zkt , W kt and σk(h), instead
of Z
{k}
t , W
{k}
t and σ{k}(h). Moreover, we use the following notation for the
ordered local CUSUM stopping times and statistics:
σ(1)(h) ≤ . . . ≤ σ(|N |)(h),
W
(1)
t ≤ . . . ≤W (|N |)t .
(3.4)
3.2. Centralized CUSUM and the optimal performance
It is useful for the subsequent development to recall some well-known properties
of the centralized CUSUM stopping time, σC(h). For every s ∈ N and C ⊆ N
we have (see, e.g., [19, Appendix 2]) that
P∞(W Cs ≥ h) ≤ e−h. (3.5)
In fact, σC(h)/eh is asymptotically exponential (see, e.g., [2]), and consequently
as h→∞
E∞ [σC(h)] ∼ Θ(1) eh. (3.6)
Moreover, we have the following decomposition of the CUSUM detection statis-
tic
W Ct = Z
C
t +m
C
t , m
C
t = − min
0≤s≤t
ZCs , (3.7)
which implies that W Ct ≥ ZCt for every t. In view of this decomposition, from
non-linear renewal theory [20, Section 2.6] it follows that when C is included in
the affected subset (C ⊆ B), then as h→∞
PB0
(
σC(h) ∼ h|C| I
)
= 1, (3.8)
and consequently for any r ≥ 1
EB0 [σ
r
C(h)] ∼
(
h
|C| I
)r
. (3.9)
Since JB [σC(h)] = EB0 [σC(h)] for every h > 0 (see, e.g. [21]), if h = hγ is so that
E∞ [σC(hγ)] = γ, then as γ →∞
JB [σC(hγ)] ∼ log γ|C|I . (3.10)
When in particular C = B and h = hγ is selected so that E∞[σB(hγ)] = γ,
σB optimizes JB within the class of detection rules Cγ [21]. This optimality
property, combined with (3.10), implies that a first-order approximation to the
optimal performance as γ →∞ is
inf
T∈Cγ
JB[T ] ∼ log γ|B| I , (3.11)
a result that was originally established in [10] in a different way. We will refer
to σB as the optimal or oracle CUSUM, as it achieves the optimal performance
but requires knowledge of the affected subset B.
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3.3. Decentralized, multichannel detection rules
When the subset of affected sensors is not known in advance, it is desirable
to design procedures that have “good” performance under any possible affected
subset. This is known to be possible even in the absence of any prior information
regarding the affected subset. Indeed, under the second moment condition (2.3),
the optimal performance is achievable up to a constant term under any possi-
ble affected subset, e.g., by the GLR-CUSUM, minC⊆N σC(h), with h = log γ
[9]. While this is a recursive rule, the number of recursions it requires grows
exponentially with the number of honest sensors, |N |. On the other hand, it
is possible to achieve the optimal performance for any possible affected subset,
up to a first-order approximation, by a procedure whose detection statistic is
an increasing function of the local CUSUM statistics (see Subsection 3.5). In
this work, we focus on multichannel sequential procedures of this form, and the
following lemma is useful for analyzing their worst-case detection delay.
Lemma 1. Let ψ : [0,∞)|N | → [0,∞) be a non-constant function that is in-
creasing in each of its arguments, and consider the detection rule
S∗(h) = inf{t ∈ N : ψ
(
W 1t , . . . ,W
|N |
t
)
≥ h}.
Then, JB [S∗(h)] = EB0 [S∗(h)] for every h > 0.
Proof. The worst-case scenario for the observations up to the time of the change
ν is that W kν = 0 for every k ∈ N . Under P∞, the process (W 1, . . . ,WN ) is
a Markov chain that regenerates whenever all its components are equal to 0,
which completes the proof.
3.4. One-shot schemes and voting rules
Let 1 ≤ L ≤ |N |. We refer to σ(L)(h), defined in (3.4), as the Lth honest alarm,
since it represents the first time the local CUSUM statistics in L honest sensors
have crossed level h. A related stopping rule is
SL(h) = inf
{
t ∈ N : W (|N |−L+1)t ≥ h
}
, (3.12)
which is the first time the local CUSUM statistics in L honest sensors are si-
multaneously above h; we will refer to it as voting rule, since it requires from
each sensor to “vote” at each time whether the change has occurred or not.
In general, we have σ(L)(h) ≤ SL(h) for every h > 0 and 1 ≤ L ≤ |N |, with
equality when L = 1. The first-alarm, σ(1), achieves the optimal asymptotic
performance (3.11) when |B| = 1, i.e., when exactly one sensor is affected by
the change [4, 5]. The “consensus” rule, S|N |, which stops when all honest local
CUSUM statistics are simultaneously above a common threshold, is also known
to be asymptotically optimal when all honest sensors are affected by the change
(B = N ) [22]. These two results were shown recently [23] to be special cases
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of a more general result, according to which the voting rule, SL, achieves the
optimal first-order asymptotic performance (3.11) when L is equal to the size
of the affected subset, |B|. In Theorem 2 we establish this result under only the
first moment condition (2.2), removing the second moment condition (2.3) that
was assumed in both [22] and [23].
Lemma 2. Let 1 ≤ L ≤ |N |. Then as h→∞
E∞ [SL(h)] ≥ Θ(1) eLh, (3.13)
E∞
[
σ(L)(h)
] ∼ Θ(1) eh. (3.14)
Proof. The lower bound in (3.13) was established in [23, Theorem 3.2]. The
asymptotic approximation in (3.14) follows from the asymptotic exponentiality
[2] of the independent stopping times σk(h), 1 ≤ k ≤ |N |.
It is clear that for both σ(L) and SL to have non-trivial detection performance,
L needs to be at most equal to the size of the affected subset, |B|. Indeed, when
L > |B|, at least one of the L alarms needs to come from an unaffected sensor,
and consequently SL(h) ≥ σ(L)(h) ≥ mink∈N\B σk(h), which means that the
expected detection delay of σ(L) and SL will be larger than the expected time
to false alarm from at least one of the unaffected sensors. Thus, the following
lemma describes the asymptotic detection delay of σ(L) and SL when L ≤ |B|.
Lemma 3. If 1 ≤ L ≤ |B|, then as h→∞
EB0
[
σ(L)(h)
] ∼ h/I ∼ EB0 [SL(h)] . (3.15)
Proof. For every h > 0 and 1 ≤ L ≤ |B| we clearly have σ(1)(h) ≤ σ(L)(h) ≤
SL(h) ≤ S|B|(h). Therefore, it suffices to show that as h→∞
EB0 [S|B|(h)] ≤
h
I (1 + o(1)),
EB0
[
σ(1)(h)
] ≥ hI (1 + o(1)).
(3.16)
For every h > 0 we have
S|B|(h) ≤ inf{t ∈ N : W kt ≥ h, ∀ k ∈ B}
≤ inf{t ∈ N : Zkt ≥ h, ∀ k ∈ B}.
The asymptotic upper bound in (3.16) then follows from Lemma 12 in the
Appendix.
It remains to prove the asymptotic lower bound in (3.16). To this end, we
observe that σ(1) can be represented as the minimum of a stopping time that
perceives the change and one that does not. Specifically:
σ(1)(h) = min
{
min
k∈B
σk(h), min
k/∈B
σk(h)
}
.
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It then suffices to show that as h→∞ we have
EB0
[
σ(1)(h)
]
= EB0
[
min
k∈B
σk(h)
]
− o(1) (3.17)
EB0
[
min
k∈B
σk(h)
]
≥ hI (1 + o(1)). (3.18)
In order to prove (3.17) we rely on Lemma 10(ii) in the Appendix. From Boole’s
inequality, for every t = 0, 1, . . ., we have
P∞
(
min
k/∈B
σk(h) ≤ t
)
≤
∑
k/∈B
P∞ (σk(h) ≤ t)
=
∑
k/∈B
P∞
(
max
1≤s≤t
W ks ≥ h
)
≤
∑
k/∈B
t∑
s=1
P∞(W ks ≥ h)
≤ t (|N | − |B|) e−h,
where the last inequality follows from (3.5). Moreover, setting r = 2 in (3.9) we
have
EB0
[
min
k∈B
σ2k(h)
]
≤ h
2
I2 (1 + o(1)).
In view of Lemma 10(ii) in the Appendix, these two inequalities prove (3.17).
Finally, we obtain (3.18) from
PB0
(
min
k∈B
σk(h)/h −→
h→∞
1/I
)
= 1
and Fatou’s lemma, the former following from (3.8).
Based on these two lemmas, we can now show that the first-order asymptotic
performance of the Lth honest alarm is independent of L. This result was shown
in [23] under the second-moment condition (2.3), which is removed in the fol-
lowing theorem.
Theorem 1. Let 1 ≤ L ≤ |N |. If h = hγ so that E∞[σ(L)(hγ)] = γ, then as
γ →∞
hγ ∼ log γ. (3.19)
If also L ≤ |B|, then
JB
[
σ(L)(hγ)
] ∼ (log γ)/I. (3.20)
Proof. We obtain (3.19) directly from (3.14). We obtain (3.20) by setting h = hγ
in (3.15) and the fact that worst-case scenario for the change-point is ν = 0.
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Remark 1. Theorem 5 reveals that the Lth honest alarm has the same first-
order asymptotic performance for any value of L between 1 and |B|. In the
absence of any information regarding the size of the affected subset, L needs to
be set equal to 1. However, Theorem 5 does not reveal how to select L when the
size of the affected subset, |B|, is known in advance. This question was addressed
in [23], where it was shown, under the second moment assumption (2.3), that
the second-order term in the asymptotic expansion of the detection delay of the
Lth alarm is a term of order
√
log γ whose coefficient is decreasing in L. This
suggests setting L = 1 independently of any prior information regarding the size
of the affected subset.
We now establish the asymptotic optimality of the voting rule, SL, when the
size of the affected subset is equal to L, without the second moment condition
that was assumed in [23]. Moreover, we show that the exponential lower bound
(3.13) is sharp in the exponent.
Theorem 2. Let 1 ≤ L ≤ |N |. If h = hγ so that E∞[SL(hγ)] = γ, then as
γ →∞
hγ ∼ (log γ)/L. (3.21)
If also L ≤ |B|, then
JB [SL(hγ)] ∼ log γ
L I . (3.22)
When in particular L = |B|,
JB
[
S|B|(hγ)
] ∼ log γ|B| I ∼ infT∈Cγ JB[T ]. (3.23)
Proof. Asymptotic approximation (3.22) follows directly from (3.15) and (3.21),
therefore it suffices to show the other two claims of the theorem.
For every 1 ≤ L ≤ |N | we have from (3.13) that as γ →∞
hγ ≤ (log γ)/L+O(1). (3.24)
Therefore, setting h = hγ in (3.15) and recalling Lemma 1 we obtain
JB [SL(hγ)] ≤ log γ
L I (1 + o(1))
whenever 1 ≤ L ≤ |B|. When in particular L = |B|, this asymptotic upper
bound coincides with the optimal asymptotic performance (3.11), and implies
(3.23).
In view of (3.24), in order to establish (3.21) it suffices to show that as γ →∞
hγ ≥ (log γ)/L((1 + o(1)).
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We will prove this by contradiction. Indeed, suppose there is a subsequence h′γ
such that h′γ ≤ (log γ)/L′ as γ →∞ for some L′ > L. Then, whenever L ≤ |B|,
from (3.15) we will have
JB [SL(hγ)] ≤ log γ
L′ I (1 + o(1)),
which contradicts (3.23) when L = |B|.
Remark 2. Suppose that it is known in advance that at least Q sensors are
affected, i.e., |B| ≥ Q, where Q is some known number between 1 and |N |.
Any value of L between 1 and Q guarantees non-trivial detection delay for the
corresponding voting rule, but the resulting first-order asymptotic detection delay
is now decreasing in L. This suggests setting L equal to the largest possible
value, i.e., Q. Note however that due to the effect of the second-order term
in the asymptotic approximation of the detection delay (see Remark 1), it has
been argued that a smaller value for L, such as L = dQ/2e may lead to better
performance in practice [23].
3.5. Sum-CUSUM
Let C ⊆ N and denote by ρC(h) the first time the sum of the local CUSUM
statistics in C is above h, i.e.,
ρC(h) = inf
{
t ∈ N :
∑
k∈C
W kt ≥ h
}
. (3.25)
This detection rule, to which we will refer as Sum-CUSUM, was proposed in [7]
and was shown to achieve the optimal performance to a first-order asymptotic
approximation (3.11) for any possible affected subset when C = N . In Theorem
3 we characterize the first-order asymptotic performance of ρC whenever C in-
tersects with the affected subset, B, and recover the result in [7] as a special
case. We note however that our proof differs from that in [7] as far as it concerns
the proof of the lower bound in (3.26).
Lemma 4. For any C ⊆ N we have as h→∞
Θ(1) eh h1−|C| ≤ E∞ [ρC(h)] ≤ Θ(1) eh. (3.26)
Proof. By definition, ρC(h) ≤ σ(1)(h) for every h > 0, therefore the upper bound
in (3.26) follows from (3.14). It remains to prove the lower bound. From (3.5)
it follows that W ks is stochastically bounded by an exponential random variable
with mean 1 for every s ∈ N and k ∈ C. As a result, ∑k∈CW ks is stochastically
bounded by an Erlang random variable with parameter |C|, i.e.,
P∞
(∑
k∈C
W ks ≥ h
)
≤ HC(h) ≡ e−h
|C|−1∑
j=0
hj
j!
. (3.27)
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For any t ∈ N and h > 0, from Boole’s inequality we have
P∞(ρC(h) ≤ t) = P∞
(
max
1≤s≤t
∑
k∈C
W ks ≥ h
)
≤
t∑
s=1
P∞
(∑
k∈C
W ks ≥ h
)
≤ tHC(h),
(3.28)
and from Lemma 10(i) in the Appendix we conclude that for every h > 0 we
have E∞[ρC(h)] ≥ 1/(2HC(h)). From the definition of HC in (3.27) we have as
h→∞
HC(h) ∼ e
−h h|C|−1
(|C| − 1)! , (3.29)
which implies the asymptotic lower bound in (3.26).
Lemma 5. If C ∩ B 6= ∅, then as h→∞
EB0 [ρC(h)] ∼
h
|C ∩ B|I . (3.30)
Proof. For every t ∈ N we observe that
WB∩Ct ≤
∑
k∈B∩C
W kt ≤
∑
k∈C
W kt ,
therefore for every h > 0 we have
ρC(h) ≤ σC∩B(h), (3.31)
and from the asymptotic approximation (3.3) we obtain
EB0 [ρC(h)] ≤ EB0 [σC∩B(h)] ∼
h
|C ∩B| I .
It remains to show that
EB0 [ρC(h)] ≥
h
|C ∩B| I (1 + o(1)).
This will follow directly from Fatou’s lemma as soon as we prove that as h→∞
ρC(h)
h
PB0−→ 1|C ∩B| I . (3.32)
In view of decomposition (3.7), for every t ∈ N we have∑
k∈C
W kt =
∑
k∈C∩B
Zkt +
∑
k∈C∩B
mkt +
∑
k∈C\B
W kt ,
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and (3.32) will then follow from non-linear renewal theory, see, e.g., [20, Lemma
2.6.1], if we show that
1
t
max
1≤s≤t
∑
k∈C∩B
mks and
1
t
max
1≤s≤t
∑
k∈C\B
W ks
converge to 0 in probability under PB0 as t → ∞. The first one holds because
for every k ∈ B the random walk Zk has positive drift I (recall (2.2)), and as
a result for every t ∈ N we have 0 ≤ −mkt ≤ −mint≥0 Zkt < ∞ almost surely
under PB0 . The second one holds because from (3.28) we have for any  > 0 that
P∞
max
1≤s≤t
∑
k∈C\B
W ks > t
 ≤ tHC\B(t),
and the upper bound goes to 0 as t→∞ in view of (3.29).
We now characterize the performance of ρC up to a first-order asymptotic
approximation whenever C intersects with B.
Theorem 3. Suppose C ∩ B 6= ∅. If h = hγ is so that E∞ [ρC(hγ)] = γ, then as
γ →∞ we have
hγ ∼ log γ, (3.33)
and
JB[ρC(hγ)] ∼ log γ|C ∩ B| I . (3.34)
When in particular B ⊆ C, we have as γ →∞
JB[ρC(hγ)] ∼ log γ|B| I ∼ infT∈Cγ JB[T ]. (3.35)
Proof. From (3.26) it follows that if we set h = hγ so that E∞[ρC(hγ)] = γ, then
as γ →∞ we have
Θ(1) ehγ h1−|C|γ ≤ γ ≤ Θ(1) ehγ (1 + o(1)).
Taking logarithms and dividing by log γ we obtain (3.33). The asymptotic ap-
proximation in (3.34) follows from (3.30) and (3.33). Comparing the asymptotic
upper bound (3.34) when B ⊆ C with the optimal asymptotic performance in
(3.11) we obtain (3.35).
3.6. Top-Sum-CUSUM
Let 1 ≤ L ≤ |N | and denote by ŜL(h) the first time the sum of the L largest
honest local CUSUM statistics is above h, i.e.,
ŜL(h) = inf
{
t ∈ N :
L∑
k=1
W
(|N |−k+1)
t ≥ h
}
, (3.36)
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to which we will refer as Top-Sum-CUSUM. This detection rule reduces to the
first honest alarm, σ(1), when L = 1, and to Sum-CUSUM, ρN , when L = |N |.
It has been proposed [24] as an efficient modification of Sum-CUSUM when the
size of the affected subset is known to be smaller or equal to L, i.e., |B| ≤ L.
Here, we analyze its asymptotic performance for any value of L.
Lemma 6. Let 1 ≤ L ≤ |N |. Then, for any subset B ⊆ N we have as h→∞
EB0
[
ŜL(h)
]
∼ h
min{L, |B|} I . (3.37)
Proof. We observe that
ŜL(h) = minC⊆N :|C|=L
ρC(h), (3.38)
When L > |N | − |B|, ŜL(h) can be expressed as follows
φBL(h) = minC⊆N :C∩B6=∅,|C|=L
ρC(h).
When L ≤ |N |−|B|, ŜL can be represented as the minimum of two independent
stopping times as follows:
ŜL(h) = min
{
φBL(h), χ
B
L(h)
}
, (3.39)
where
χBL(h) = minC⊆N :C∩B=∅,|C|=L
ρC(h).
It then suffices to show that as h→∞
EB0
[
φBL
] ∼ h
min{L, |B|} I (3.40)
and
EB0
[
ŜL(h)
]
= EB0
[
φBL(h)
]− o(1). (3.41)
We start with the proof of (3.40). For every subset C ⊆ N of size L that
intersects with B we have
EB0
[
φBL(h)
] ≤ EB0 [ρC(h)] ∼ h|C ∩ B| I , (3.42)
where the asymptotic equivalence follows from (3.30). Minimizing the asymp-
totic upper bound with respect to C we obtain
EB0
[
φBL(h)
] ≤ h
min{L, |B|} I (1 + o(1)),
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since
max
C⊆N :C∩B6=∅,|C|=L
|C ∩ B| = min{L, |B|}. (3.43)
In order to prove (3.40), it remains to show that
EB0
[
φBL(h)
] ≥ h
min{L, |B|} I (1 + o(1)).
This follows from Fatou’s lemma and
φBL(h)
h
PB0−→ 1
min{L, |B|}I ,
the latter being a consequence of (3.32) and (3.43).
In order to prove (3.41), we focus without loss of generality on the case that
L ≤ |N |−|B|, and we utilize Lemma 10(ii) in the Appendix. We observe that for
every C ⊆ N of size L that intersects with B, we have φBL(h) ≤ ρC(h) ≤ σC∩B(h)
for every h, where the second inequality follows from (3.31). Therefore, setting
r = 2 in (3.9) we obtain
EB0
[(
φBL(h)
)2]
= O(h2).
Moreover, for every h > 0 we have χBL(h) ≥ ρN\B(h), and consequently for every
t ∈ N we obtain
P∞
(
χBL(h) ≤ t
) ≤ P∞ (ρN\B(h) ≤ t)
≤ tHN\C(h),
where the second inequality follows from (3.28). From the definition of HN\C in
(3.27) it follows that h2HN\C(h) → 0 as h → ∞, which completes the proof of
(3.41).
We now the characterize, the asymptotic performance of Top-Sum-CUSUM.
Theorem 4. Let 1 ≤ L ≤ |N |. If h = hγ is selected so that E∞[ŜL(hγ)] = γ,
then as γ →∞ we have hγ ∼ log γ and
JB
[
ŜL(hγ)
]
∼ log γ
min{|B|, L} I . (3.44)
When in particular L ≥ |B|,
JB
[
ŜL(hγ)
]
∼ log γ|B| I ∼ infT∈Cγ JB[T ]. (3.45)
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Proof. For every h > 0 and 1 ≤ L ≤ |N | it is clear that
ρN (h) ≡ Ŝ|N |(h) ≤ ŜL(h) ≤ Ŝ1(h) ≡ σ(1)(h).
From (3.19) and (3.33) it follows that if we set h = hγ so that E∞[ŜL(hγ)] = γ,
then as γ →∞ we have
Θ(1) ehγ h1−|N|γ ≤ γ ≤ Θ(1) ehγ (1 + o(1)).
Taking logarithms and dividing by hγ we obtain that hγ ∼ log γ. This observa-
tion, combined with Lemma 6 implies (3.44). Finally, (3.45) follows by compar-
ing (3.44) with the optimal asymptotic performance (3.11) when L ≥ |B|.
3.7. Low-Sum-CUSUM
Let 1 ≤ L ≤ |N | and denote by S˜L(h) the first time the sum of the L smallest
honest CUSUM statistics is above h, i.e.,
S˜L(h) = inf
{
t ∈ N :
L∑
k=1
W
(k)
t ≥ h
}
, (3.46)
to which we will refer as Low-Sum-CUSUM. It is clear that S˜L reduces to the
consensus rule, S|N |, when L = 1, and to Sum-CUSUM, ρN , when L = |N |. To
the best of our knowledge, this procedure has not been studied when 1 < L <
|N |. In Theorem 5 we show that S˜L is asymptotically optimal, for any choice
of L, when all honest sensors are affected by the change (B = N ). This rule will
turn out to be well-suited to address the presence of corrupt sensors, which is
our focus in the next section.
Lemma 7. Let 1 ≤ L ≤ |N |. As h→∞ we have
E∞
[
S˜L(h)
]
≥ Θ(1) exp{(|N |/L)h}. (3.47)
Proof. For any t ∈ N and h > 0, from Boole’s inequality we have
P∞(S˜L(h) ≤ t) = P∞
(
max
1≤s≤t
L∑
k=1
W (k)s ≥ h
)
≤
t∑
s=1
P∞
(
L∑
k=1
W (k)s ≥ h
)
.
From (3.5) it follows that W
(k)
s is stochastically bounded by an exponential
random variable with mean 1, therefore
∑L
k=1W
(k)
s is stochastically bounded
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by the sum of the smallest L, among |N |, independent exponential random
variables with mean 1. Therefore, from Lemma 11 in the Appendix we obtain
P∞
(
L∑
k=1
W (k)s ≥ h
)
≤ GL(h)
where GL is defined in (6.2). From Lemma 10(i) in the Appendix we conclude
that E∞[S˜L(h)] ≥ 1/(2GL(h)) for every h > 0, and from Lemma 11 in the
Appendix we have that as h→∞
GL(h) ∼ Θ(1) exp{−(|N |/L)h},
which implies (3.47).
It is clear that Low-Sum-CUSUM has non-trivial detection performance
whenever L is larger than the number of non-affected sensors, |N | − |B|, so
that there is always at least one term in the detection statistic that corresponds
to a local CUSUM statistic from an affected sensor. Under this assumption, we
now characterize its worst-case detection delay up to a first-order approximation.
Lemma 8. If L > |N | − |B|, then as h→∞ we have
EB0
[
S˜L(h)
]
∼ h
(L− |N |+ |B|) I . (3.48)
Proof. For any t ∈ N we have
L∑
k=1
W
(k)
t = minC⊆N :|C|=L
∑
k∈C
W kt . (3.49)
When L > |N | − |B|, a lower bound for the sum of the L smallest honest
CUSUM statistics is obtained when we set the CUSUM statistics in the |N |−|B|
unaffected sensors equal to 0. Then, in view of (3.49), we have for every t ∈ N
L∑
k=1
W
(k)
t ≥ minC⊆B:|C|=L−|N|+|B|
∑
k∈C
W kt
≥ min
C⊆B:|C|=L−|N|+|B|
∑
k∈C
Zkt ,
where the second inequality holds because Zkt ≤W kt for every t. As a result, for
every h > 0 we have
S˜L(h) ≤ inf
{
t ∈ N : min
C⊆B:|C|=L−|N|+|B|
∑
k∈C
Zkt ≥ h
}
.
Fellouris, Bayraktar and Lai/Efficient Byzantine Sequential Change Detection 20
Then, from Lemma 12 in the Appendix it follows that as h→∞
EB0
[
S˜L(h)
]
≤ h
(L− |N |+ |B|) I (1 + o(1)).
In order to show that this asymptotic upper bound is sharp, we observe that
from the definition of ρC in (3.25) and (3.49) we have
S˜L(h) ≥ maxC⊆N :|C|=L ρC(h)
≥ max
C⊆N :C∩B6=∅,|C|=L
ρC(h) ≡ ψBL(h).
(3.50)
From (3.32) we know that for any subset C that intersects with B
ρC(h)
h
PB0−→ 1|C ∩ B| I ,
and this implies
ψBL(h)
h
PB0−→ 1
(L− |N |+ |B|) I ,
since
min
C⊆N :C∩B6=∅,|C|=L
|C ∩ B| = L− |N |+ |B|.
Therefore, from Fatou’s lemma we obtain
EB0
[
ψBL(h)
] ≥ h
(L− |N |+ |B|) I (1 + o(1)).
This asymptotic lower bound and (3.50) imply
EB0
[
S˜L(h)
]
≥ h
(L− |N |+ |B|) I (1 + o(1)),
which completes the proof.
In the following theorem we show that Low-Sum-CUSUM preserves, for any
choice of L, the asymptotic optimality of the consensus rule S˜1 ≡ S|N |, when all
honest sensors are affected by the change (B = N ). The asymptotic optimality
property allows us further to show that the exponential lower bound in (3.47)
is sharp in the exponent.
Theorem 5. Let 1 ≤ L ≤ |N | and h = hγ so that E∞[S˜L(hγ)] = γ. Then, as
γ →∞ we have
hγ ∼ (L/|N |) log γ. (3.51)
Suppose further that L > |N | − |B|. Then as γ →∞
JB
[
S˜L(hγ)
]
∼ L|N |
log γ
(L− |N |+ |B|) I . (3.52)
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In the special case that all honest sensors are affected (B = N ), for every
1 ≤ L ≤ |N | we have
JN
[
S˜L(hγ)
]
∼ log γ|N |I ∼ infT∈Cγ JN [T ]. (3.53)
Proof. Asymptotic approximation (3.52) follows directly by (3.48) and (3.51),
thus, we focus on the proof of the two other claims. From (3.47) it follows that
if h = hγ so that E∞[S˜L(hγ)] = γ, then as γ →∞
hγ ≤ (L/|N |) log γ +O(1). (3.54)
From Lemma 1, (3.48) and (3.54) we have
JB
[
S˜L(hγ)
]
≤ L|N |
log γ
(L− |N |+ |B|) I (1 + o(1)).
Comparing this asymptotic upper bound with the optimal asymptotic perfor-
mance (3.11) when B = N , we obtain the asymptotic optimality property (3.53).
In view of (3.54), in order to prove (3.51) it suffices to show that as γ →∞
hγ ≥ (L/|N |) (log γ) (1 + o(1)).
This will follow by arguing via contradiction. Indeed, if there is a subsequence
h′γ so that h
′
γ ≤ (L′/|N |) log γ as γ →∞ for some L′ > L, then from Lemma 8
it follows that
JN [S˜L(hγ)] ≤ L
′
L|N | (1 + o(1)),
which contradicts (3.53).
4. The Byzantine setup
In this section we focus on the main theme of this paper, that is the design
of multichannel, sequential change-detection procedures that are robust in the
presence of corrupt sensors.
We will still utilize the notation introduced in Subsection 3.1 when we refer
to events that depend only on honest sensors. However, we will now need some
additional notation when we do not know whether the sensors to which we refer
are honest or corrupt. Thus, for any subset of sensors C ⊆ [K] we denote by Y C
the CUSUM statistic for detecting a change in subset C, i.e.,
Y Ct =
(
Y Ct−1 +
∑
k∈C
`kt
)+
, t ∈ N, (4.1)
where Y C0 = 0 and `
k
t is defined in (3.2). We denote by τC(h) be the first time
the process Y C exceeds a positive threshold h, i.e.,
τC(h) = inf
{
t ∈ N : Y Ct ≥ h
}
. (4.2)
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When C = {k} for some k ∈ [K], we simply write Y kt and τk(h), instead of Y {k}t
and τ{k}(h). Finally, we use the following notation for the ordered local CUSUM
stopping times and statistics:
τ(1)(h) ≤ . . . ≤ τ(K)(h), Y (1)t ≤ . . . ≤ Y (K)t . (4.3)
Our goal is to design procedures that are able to detect the change quickly
and reliably in the worst case scenario regarding the corrupt sensors, for any
subset of honest sensors that perceive the change. To this end, we assume that
there is a user-specified upper bound, M , on the number of corrupt sensors,
and we focus our analysis on the worst possible case that there are exactly M
corrupt sensors, with the understanding that the proposed procedures will still
be able to detect the change reliably when the actual number of corrupt sensors
is smaller than M . Thus, from now on we have |N | = K−M , and consequently
1 ≤ |B| ≤ K −M , since B ⊆ N .
4.1. The proposed procedures
We will study three of the families of multichannel detection schemes that we
considered in the previous section: the Lth alarm, τ(L)(h), defined in (4.3), the
voting rule
TL(h) = inf
{
t ∈ N : Y (K−L+1)t ≥ h
}
, (4.4)
and Low-Sum-CUSUM,
T˜L(h) = inf
{
t ∈ N :
L∑
k=1
Y
(k)
t ≥ h
}
, (4.5)
where L is some number between 1 and K. Thus, τ(L)(h) is the first time L
sensors, honest or not, cross threshold h, TL(h) is the first time L CUSUM
statistics, honest or not, are simultaneously above threshold h, and T˜L(h) is the
first time the sum of the L smallest local, honest or not, CUSUM statistics is
larger than h.
Remark 3. We do not consider Top-Sum-CUSUM in this context, because with
any rule of this form the adversary can trigger unilaterally false alarms before
the change, violating the desired false alarm control.
4.2. Preliminary results
The following lemma is important for the subsequent development, as it rep-
resents the operating characteristics of the proposed procedures in terms of
operating characteristics of schemes that involve only honest sensors, thus, al-
lowing us to use the results from the previous section. It also reveals that only
values of L larger than M are relevant for all three schemes.
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Lemma 9. Suppose that L > M . Then, for every threshold h > 0 and subset
B ⊆ N we have
A [τ(L)(h)] = E∞ [σ(L−M)(h)] ,
JB
[
τ(L)(h)
]
= EB0
[
σ(L)(h)
]
,
(4.6)
A [TL(h)] = E∞[SL−M (h)],
JB [TL(h)] = EB0 [SL(h)] ,
(4.7)
and
A
[
T˜L(h)
]
= E∞
[
S˜L(h)
]
,
JB
[
T˜L(h)
]
= EB0
[
S˜L−M (h)
]
.
(4.8)
Proof. For simplicity, we suppress the dependence on threshold h. As far as it
concerns the false alarm rate of the proposed schemes, the worst-case scenario
regarding the data in the corrupt sensors is when the CUSUM statistics from
the corrupt sensors are never smaller than the ones from the honest sensors, i.e.,
min
k/∈N
Y kt ≥ max
k∈N
Y kt , ∀ t ∈ N.
In this case, τ(L) coincides with the (L−M)- honest alarm, i.e., τ(L) = σ(L−M),
TL stops as soon as L−M of the honest CUSUM statistics are simultaneously
above h, i.e., TL = SL−M , and T˜L stops when the sum of the lowest L honest
CUSUM statistics is above h, i.e., T˜L = S˜L.
As far as it concerns the detection delay of the proposed rules, the worst case
scenario regarding the data in the corrupt sensors is when
Y kt = 0, ∀ k /∈ N , ∀ t ∈ N.
Then, τ(L) stops as soon as L honest sensors have raised an alarm, i.e., τ(L) =
σ(L), TL stops at the first time L honest CUSUM statistics are simultaneously
above h, i.e., TL = SL, whereas T˜L stops when the sum of the L −M lowest
honest CUSUM statistics crosses h, i.e., T˜L = S˜L−M . In view of Lemma 1, this
completes the proof.
4.3. The range of L
From (4.6)-(4.7) it follows that for τ(L) and TL to control the worst-case false
alarm rate, L needs to be larger than M , and for τ(L) and TL to have non-trivial
detection delay, L needs to be at most equal to the size of the affected subset,
|B|, or equivalently at least L honest sensors need to be affected by the change.
Thus, for these detection rules we will require that
M + 1 ≤ L ≤ |B| ≤ K −M, (4.9)
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where the last inequality always holds because |B| ≤ |N | = K −M .
On the other hand, from (4.8) it follows that for Low-Sum-CUSUM, T˜L, to
control the worst case false alarm rate, L needs to be at most equal to the
number of honest sensors, K −M (otherwise, a corrupt CUSUM statistic will
always be included in the detection statistic), and for T˜L to have non-trivial
detection delay, we need not only L > M , but also that L−M > |N | − |B|, or
equivalently L > K − |B| (see the discussion prior to Lemma 8). Consequently,
for T˜L we require that
K + 1− |B| ≤ L ≤ K −M. (4.10)
This condition implies that for T˜L to detect the change, the size of the affected
subset must satisfy
K −M ≥ |B| ≥ K + 1− L ≥M + 1,
where again the first inequality always holds.
4.4. A special case
In view of conditions (4.9)-(4.10), we focus on the case that M + 1 ≤ |B| ≤
|N | = K −M . A particular case of interest is when K −M = M + 1, in which
case all honest sensors are affected (B = N ). Then, conditions (4.9)-(4.10) imply
that the only possible value for L is M + 1 for all three schemes, and Theorem
9 reveals a clear ordering for these schemes. This is the content of Corollary 1
below, for which we use the notion of domination in Definition 1.
Corollary 1. Suppose that all honest sensors are affected (B = N ) and that
|N | ≡ K−M = M + 1. Then, the (M + 1)-alarm, τ(M+1), dominates the voting
rule, TM+1, and the latter dominates Low-Sum-CUSUM, T˜M+1.
Proof. Fix some arbitrary h > 0. Then, it suffices to show
A
[
T˜M+1(h)
]
≤ A [TM+1(h)] = A
[
τ(M+1)(h)
]
,
JN
[
T˜M+1(h)
]
= JN [TM+1(h)] ≥ JN
[
τ(M+1)(h)
]
.
In view of Lemma 9, it suffices to show
E∞
[
S˜M+1(h)
]
≤ E∞ [S1(h)] = E∞
[
σ(1)(h)
]
.
EN0
[
S˜1(h)
]
= EN0 [SM+1(h)] ≥ EN0
[
σ(M+1)(h)
]
.
By definition, σ(L)(h) ≤ SL(h), with equality when L = 1, therefore it suffices
to show that
S˜M+1(h) ≤ σ(1)(h) and S˜1(h) = SM+1(h).
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The equality holds because by definition S˜1(h) coincides with the consensus rule
S|N |(h), and we further assume that |N | = M+1. The inequality holds because
when M + 1 = K −M , S˜M+1(h) coincides with Sum-CUSUM, ρN (h), defined
in (3.25), which can never be larger than the corresponding first honest alarm,
i.e., ρN (h) ≤ σ(1)(h).
In what follows, we focus on the asymptotic performance of the proposed
rules. This will allow us to compare them when M + 1 < K −M , and also to
provide a quantification of the inflicted performance loss due to the presence of
corrupt sensors when the false alarm rate is small.
4.5. Asymptotic analysis of the Lth alarm
In this section we characterize, to a first-order asymptotic approximation, the
performance of the Lth alarm, τ(L), when (4.9) holds.
Theorem 6. Suppose L > M . If h = hγ so that E∞
[
σ(L−M)(hγ)
]
= γ, then
τ(L)(hγ) ∈ Cγ . If, additionally, |B| ≥ L, then as γ →∞
JB
[
τ(L)(hγ)
] ∼ (log γ)/I. (4.11)
Proof. From (4.6) we have that for every h > 0
JB
[
τ(L)(h)
]
= EB0
[
σ(L)(h)
]
,
A [τ(L)(h)] = E∞ [σ(L−M)(h)] .
Thus, it suffices to show that if h = hγ so that E∞[σ(L−M)(hγ)] = γ, then
EB0
[
σ(L)(hγ)
] ∼ (log γ)/I. (4.12)
From (3.15) we have EB0 [σ(L)(h)] ∼ h/I as h → ∞, and from (3.19) that hγ ∼
log γ as γ →∞, which implies (4.12).
Remark 4. Theorem 6 shows that the first-order asymptotic performance of
the Lth alarm is the same for any value of L between M + 1 and |B|. In view
of Remark 1, the proposed choice for L is the smallest possible. This suggest
setting L = M + 1, independently of whether the size of the affected subset is
known in advance or not.
4.6. Asymptotic analysis of the centralized Lth alarm
The detection performance of the Lth alarm can be improved significantly if
it is applied to groups of sensors, instead of individual sensors, an idea that
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was suggested in [17] in the special case M = 1. Indeed, let C1, . . . , C2M+1 be a
partition of [K], i.e.,
Ci ∩ Cj = ∅ ∀ 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2M + 1
and
2M+1⋃
i=1
Ci = [K].
(4.13)
Let τˇi(h) be the CUSUM stopping time of the i
th group, i.e., τˇi(h) ≡ τCi(h),
where τCi(h) is defined in (4.2). In the following theorem we characterize the
first-order asymptotic performance of the detection rule that stops when M + 1
groups have raised an alarm, i.e., at τˇ(M+1)(h), where
τˇ(1)(h) ≤ . . . ≤ τˇ(2M+1)(h).
For simplicity of presentation, for the following theorem we restrict ourselves
to the case that all honest sensors are affected by the change (B = N ), and
K is a multiple of 2M + 1. Moreover, we denote by Nˇ the subset of honest
groups, by {σˇk, k ∈ Nˇ} the alarm times from only the honest groups, and we
set σˇ(1) ≤ . . . ≤ σˇ(M+1).
Theorem 7. Suppose that B = N and that K is a multiple of 2M+1. Moreover
consider a partition (4.13) in which all subsets have the same size, K/(2M+1).
If we set h = hγ so that E∞[σˇ(1)(hγ)] = γ, then τˇ(M+1)(hγ) ∈ Cγ . Moreover, as
γ →∞
JN
[
τˇ(M+1)(hγ)
] ∼ 2M + 1
K
log γ
I . (4.14)
Proof. In the worst-case scenario for both the detection delay and the false
alarm rate, there are M groups that contain exactly one corrupt sensor each,
and all other groups consist of only honest sensors. Then, similarly to (4.6) we
have for every h > 0 that
A[τˇ(M+1)(h)] = E∞
[
σˇ(1)(h)
]
,
JN [τˇ(M+1)(h)] = EN0
[
σˇ(M+1)(h)
]
,
and similarly to (3.14) and (3.15) it can be shown that
E∞
[
σˇ(1)(h)
] ∼ Θ(1) eh,
EN0
[
σˇ(M+1)(h)
] ∼ 2M + 1
K
h
I ,
which implies (4.14).
Remark 5. A comparison of (4.11) and (4.14) reveals that, under the condi-
tions of Theorem 7, the centralized (M+1)-alarm is asymptotically more efficient
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than the decentralized (M + 1)-alarm (recall Definition 2), since its first-order
asymptotic detection delay is K/(2M + 1) smaller. We will see in the next sec-
tions that we can achieve even better asymptotic performance with the other two
procedures under consideration.
Remark 6. The decentralized and centralized second-alarm, τ(2) and τˇ(2), were
proposed in [17], in the case that all honest sensors are affected, and asymptotic
upper bounds were obtained for the performance of these procedures. Setting
L = 2 and M = 1 in Theorems 6 and 7 we improve upon these results by
characterizing the performance of τ(2) and τˇ(2) up to a first-order asymptotic
approximation.
4.7. Asymptotic analysis of the voting rule
We now study the asymptotic performance of the voting rule, TL, that was de-
fined in (4.4).
Theorem 8. Suppose that L > M . If h = hγ is so that E∞[SL−M (hγ)] = γ,
then TL(hγ) ∈ Cγ . If also |B| ≥ L, then as γ →∞ we have
JB [TL(hγ)] ∼ log γ
(L−M) I . (4.15)
Proof. From (4.7) we know that for every h > 0
A [TL(h)] = E∞ [SL−M (h)] ,
JB [TL(h)] = EB0 [SL(h)].
From (3.15) we have that EB0 [SL(h)] ∼ h/I as h → ∞, and from (3.21) that if
h = hγ is so that E∞[SL−M (hγ)] = γ, then hγ ∼ (log γ)/(L −M) as γ → ∞.
This implies that as γ →∞
EB0 [SL(hγ)] ∼
log γ
(L−M) I (4.16)
and completes the proof.
Remark 7. From (4.15) it follows that the asymptotic worse-case detection de-
lay of the voting rule, TL, is decreasing in L, which implies that L should be as
large as possible. Since L must be at most equal to the size of the affected subset,
|B|, this means that the selection of L in the family of voting rules depends heav-
ily on prior knowledge regarding |B|. Indeed, in the absence of any information,
L must be set equal to M + 1, and the resulting first-order asymptotic perfor-
mance is the same as that of the (M + 1)-alarm, τ(M+1). On the other hand, in
the ideal case that |B| is known in advance, the asymptotic approximation (4.15)
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suggests setting L = |B|, in which case the resulting first-order asymptotic per-
formance is |B|−M times smaller than that of the (M + 1)-alarm. We will now
see that this asymptotic performance is achieved by Low-Sum-CUSUM, without
prior knowledge of |B|.
4.8. Asymptotic performance of Low-Sum-CUSUM
We now turn to the asymptotic analysis of Low-Sum-CUSUM, that was defined
in (4.5).
Theorem 9. Suppose 1 ≤ L ≤ K −M . If h = hγ is so that E∞[S˜L(hγ)] = γ,
then T˜L(hγ) ∈ Cγ . If also L > K − |B|, then as γ →∞ we have that
JB
[
T˜L(hγ)
]
∼ L
K −M
log γ
(|B| − (K − L)) I . (4.17)
Proof. From (4.8) we have for every h > 0 that
A
[
T˜L(h)
]
= E∞
[
S˜L(h)
]
,
JB
[
T˜L(h)
]
= EB0
[
S˜L−M (h)
]
.
From (3.48) it follows that as h→∞
EB0
[
S˜L−M (h)
]
∼ h
(L−M − |N |+ |B|) I ,
and from Theorem 5 that if h = hγ is selected so that E∞[S˜L(hγ)] = γ, then
hγ ∼ (L/|N |) log γ. Thus, setting h = hγ in the previous relationship and using
the fact that |N | = K −M , we obtain (4.17).
The asymptotic performance (4.17) of Low-Sum-CUSUM is decreasing in
L, which implies that L should be selected equal to its largest possible value,
K − M . Therefore, the proposed value of L for Low-Sum-CUSUM does not
require knowledge of the size of the affected subset. The following corollary de-
scribes the resulting first-order asymptotic performance.
Corollary 2. For any γ ≥ 1, if h = hγ is so that E∞[S˜K−M (hγ)] = γ, then
T˜K−M (hγ) ∈ Cγ . If |B| ≥M + 1, then as γ →∞ we have
JB
[
T˜K−M (hγ)
]
∼ log γ
(|B| −M) I . (4.18)
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4.9. Discussion
We now summarize the main results of this section. First of all, in the special
case that K −M = M + 1, the only possible choice for L for all three families
under consideration is M + 1 and, for any given false alarm rate, the (M + 1)-
alarm dominates the corresponding voting rule, TM+1, and the latter dominates
the corresponding Low-Sum-CUSUM, T˜M+1.
When K −M > M + 1, the proposed values for L are M + 1 and K −M
for τ(L) and T˜L, respectively, thus, they do not require knowledge of the size
of the affected subset, |B|, and the first-order asymptotic detection delay of
Low-Sum-CUSUM, T˜K−M is |B| −M smaller than that of the (M + 1)-alarm.
On the other hand, the selection of L for the voting rule, TL, depends on prior
knowledge regarding |B|. However, even in the ideal case that |B| is known in
advance, the asymptotic performance of the voting rule with L = |B|, T|B|, is
the same as that of Low-Sum-CUSUM, T˜K−M .
Finally, we found that although the centralized (M +1)-alarm achieves much
better asymptotic performance than the corresponding decentralized (M + 1)-
alarm, it is always asymptotically less efficient than Low-Sum-CUSUM.
Remark 8. In Section 3 we saw that, in the absence of corrupt sensors, it is
possible to achieve the optimal asymptotic performance (3.11) for any affected
subset B ⊆ N , up to a first-order asymptotic approximation, or even up to
a constant term, even if there is absolutely no information about the affected
subset. This is not the case in the presence of corrupt sensors, at least for the
detection rules that we study here. Indeed, comparing (3.10) with (4.18) we can
see that the best first-order asymptotic performance that can be achieved by the
proposed procedures is the same as that of a centralized CUSUM rule that utilizes
only |B| −M , not |B|, honest, affected senors.
5. Simulation Experiments
We now illustrate our theoretical findings in the previous section with two sim-
ulation studies where all honest sensors are normally distributed with variance
1 and mean 0 before the change and 1 after the change, i.e., f = N (0, 1) and
g = N (1, 1). That is, all honest sensors are affected by the change (B = N ).
In the first simulation study, there are M = 2 corrupt and |N | = 3 honest
sensors, therefore K = 2M +1. In Figures 1(a),(c) we compare the performance
of the (M + 1)-alarm, τ(M+1), the voting rule, TM+1, and Low-Sum-CUSUM,
T˜M+1. As predicted by Corollary 1, we see that τ(M+1) dominates TM+1, and
TM+1 dominates T˜M+1 for any level of the false alarm rate.
In the second simulation study, we have M = 1 corrupt and |N | = 5 honest
sensors, thus, K > 2M + 1. In Figures 1(b),(d), we compare the performance of
τ(M+1), T˜K−M , and the voting rule, TK−M , which assumes knowledge of the fact
that all honest sensors are affected. Moreover, we consider the centralized version
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of the (M + 1)-alarm studied in Section 4.5. As expected from our asymptotic
results, we observe that the centralized (M + 1)-alarm performs better than
the decentralized (M + 1)-alarm, τ(M+1), but worse compared to the voting
rule TK−M . A more interesting observation is that Low-Sum-CUSUM, T˜K−M ,
performs better than the voting rule, TK−M , despite the fact that they have the
same first-order asymptotic performance.
6. Conclusions
In the classical multisensor sequential change-detection problem, data are col-
lected sequentially from a number of sensors, and the goal is to detect quickly
and accurately a change that is perceived by only an unknown subset of these
sensors, while the observations in all non-affected sensors continue following
their initial distribution. In this classical setup, any model mis-specification in
the non-affected sensors is ignored and underestimated. In this paper we con-
sidered a different formulation of this problem, in which at most M unknown
sensors are considered to be unreliable and are treated as if they are controlled
by an adversary. This generalizes the formulation in [17], in that we allow for
more than one corrupt sensors, i.e., M ≥ 1, and we assume that the subset, B, of
honest sensors affected by the change is unknown. We proposed three families of
detection rules that were evaluated under a generalization of Lorden’s criterion,
in the worst case scenario regarding the strategy of the adversary, when there
are exactly M corrupt sensors. However, as in the classical multichannel setup,
we did not adopt a worst case approach with respect to the affected subset of
sensors, B.
The first proposed procedure stops as soon as M + 1 local CUSUM statistics
have crossed a common threshold. This procedure is shown to be the best, in
an exact sense, than all other proposed rules in the special that there are M + 1
honest sensors, all affected by the change. Setting M = 1 reveals that second
alarm, proposed in [17], is the best rule among the ones considered here in the
special case of K = 3 sensors. In the general case that the number of honest
sensors exceeds the number of corrupt sensors by more than 1, the previous
scheme can be very inefficient, as its first-order asymptotic performance is shown
to be independent of the size of the affected subset. We show that it is possible
to achieve much better performance with a novel procedure, which also does
not require knowledge of the true size of the affected subset. This procedure
stops as soon as the sum of the smallest K −M local CUSUM statistics crosses
a fixed threshold, and we refer to it as Low-Sum-CUSUM. We show that its
first-order asymptotic performance is the same as that of a centralized CUSUM
that relies on |B| −M honest sensors, all affected by the change. We conjecture
that this is the best possible first-order asymptotic performance in the presence
of M corrupt sensors, but the proof of this result is an open problem.
These results are not relevant only for the design of sequential change-detection
rules in an adversarial setup, but can also be useful for the “robustification” of
existing multichannel procedures. Indeed, when there is a large number of sen-
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Fig 1: In all graphs, the horizontal axis corresponds to the worst-case expected
time to false alarm (in log scale), i.e., log γ. In (a) and (b), the vertical axis
corresponds to the worst-case detection delay, whereas in (c) and (d) to a nor-
malized version of the latter, i.e., divided by (log γ)/(K− 2M)I). In all graphs,
the solid, dark lines corresponds to the Low-Sum-CUSUM, the dashed line to
the voting rule, and the gray, solid line to the M + 1 alarm. The gray, dotted
line in (b) and (d) corresponds to the centralized version of the M + 1 alarm.
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sors, K, and a non-trivial lower bound Q on the size of the affected subset, our
results suggest that Low-Sum-CUSUM with a small M ≤ Q can lead to more
robust behavior with a relatively small price in efficiency.
The procedures under consideration have low computational complexity. The
heavier communication requirements from the sensors to the fusion center are
imposed by Low-Sum-CUSUM, which requires that each sensor transmits the
value of its local CUSUM statistic at each time. It is possible to design bandwidth-
efficient modifications of this scheme, thresholding each local CUSUM statistic
below and communicating only when its value is above this threshold [24]. It is
also possible to design energy-efficient modifications of Low-Sum-CUSUM [25],
where the local CUSUM statistics do not need to be observed continuously at
the sensors.
Similarly to [17], we have focused on the case that the pre-change distribution
is the same in all honest sensors, and the post-change distribution is the same
in all honest sensors affected by the change. Another interesting generalization
of our work is in the non-homogeneous setup. Finally, our setup is clearly rele-
vant in security related applications. An interesting alternative approach in this
context is a game-theoretic formulation.
Appendix
In this Appendix, all random variables are defined on some probability space
(Ω,F ,P).
Lemma 10. Let Xg, Yg be independent, non-negative, integer-valued random
variables, parametrized by some positive constant g.
(i) If P(Xg ≤ t) ≤ t/g for every t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ., then E[Xg] ≥ g/2.
(ii) If additionally E[Y 2g ] = o(g) as g →∞, then E[Yg] = E[min{Xg, Yg}]+o(1)
as g →∞.
Proof. (i) From the assumption of the Lemma and the non-negativity of prob-
ability it follows that P(Xg > t) ≥ (1− t/g)+. Therefore,
E[Xg] = 1 +
∞∑
t=1
P(Xg > t)
≥ 1 +
bgc∑
t=1
(1− t/g)
= 1 + bgc − bgc(1 + bgc)
2g
= (1 + bgc)
(
1− bgc
2g
)
≥ g/2.
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(ii) From the independence of Xg and Yg it follows that
P(Xg > t, Yg > t) = P(Xg > t)P(Yg > t)
= P(Yg > t)− P(Xg ≤ t) · P(Yg > t)
for every t = 0, 1, . . .. Therefore,
E[min{Xg, Yg}] = E[Yg]−
∞∑
t=0
P(Xg ≤ t)P(Yg > t),
and it suffices to show that the second term on the right-hand side goes to 0 as
g →∞. Indeed, by the assumption on the cdf of Xg we have
∞∑
t=0
P(Xg ≤ t)P(Yg > t) ≤ 1
g
∞∑
t=0
tP(Yg > t)
=
1
2g
E[Y 2g ]
and the upper bound goes to 0 by the assumption on the second moment on Yg.
Lemma 11. Let ξ1, . . . , ξ|N | be independent, exponential random variables with
mean 1, and consider the order-statistics ξ(1) ≤ . . . ≤ ξ(|N |). For each 1 ≤ L ≤
|N | and h > 0 set
GL(h) ≡ P
(
L∑
k=1
ξ(k) > h
)
. (6.1)
Then, as h→∞
GL(h) ∼ Θ(1) exp{−(|N |/L)h}. (6.2)
Proof. Set ξ0 = 0. From the so-called Re´nyi representation [26] it follows that
the spacings ηj = ξ(j)−ξ(j−1), 1 ≤ j ≤ |N | are independent, exponential random
variables such that
ηj ∼ E(|N | − j + 1) ∼ ξj|N | − j + 1 , 1 ≤ j ≤ |N |.
Then,
L∑
k=1
ξ(k) =
L∑
k=1
k∑
j=1
ηj =
L∑
j=1
L∑
k=j
ηj =
L∑
j=1
(L− j + 1)ηj ,
and consequently we have
L∑
k=1
ξ(k)
D
=
L∑
j=1
λj ξj ,
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where
λj =
L− j + 1
|N | − j + 1 , 1 ≤ j ≤ L.
Therefore, when L < |N |, we have λ1 > . . . > λ|N | and from [27, Lemma 11.3.1]
it follows that there are positive numbers CL, 1 ≤ L < |N | so that
GL(h) =
L∑
j=1
Cje
−h/λj ∼ C1e−h/λ1 = C1e−(|N |/L)h.
Lemma 12 ([28]). Let {U it}t∈N, 1 ≤ i ≤ M be possibly dependent, random
walks with positive drifts. That is, for any given 1 ≤ i ≤ M , the increments
{U it −U it−1}t∈N are integrable, iid random variables with mean µi > 0. Consider
the family of stopping times
Tb = inf
{
t ∈ N : min
1≤i≤M
U it ≥ b
}
,
where b > 0. Then, as b→∞ we have
E[Tb] ∼ b
min1≤i≤M µi
.
Proof. This is a special case of [28, Theorem 3]
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